Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment Mediation at the USPS by Bingham, Lisa B. et al.
Exploring the Role of Representation in
Employment Mediation at the USPS
LISA B. BINGHAM, KIWHAN KIM, & SUSAN SUMMERS RAINES*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 342
II. RESEARCHING EMPLOYMENT DISPuTE RESOLUTION ........................... 343
I. ATTORNEYS AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES ........................................ 347
IV. PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: A THEORETICAL FRAME ............................ 352
V. EMPLOYMENT MEDIATION AT THE USPS ............................................. 355
VI. DATA AND METHODS ............................................................................ 359
A. Data Tracking Reports ..................................................................... 359
B . Exit Surveys ...................................................................................... 359
VII. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 360
A. Data Tracking Reports from Mediators ........................................... 360
B. Settlem ent Rates ................................................................................ 361
C. M ediation D uration .......................................................................... 362
D. Data Analysis of Participant Exit Surveys ....................................... 363
E. Participants' Reports of Mediation Outcomes ................................. 364
F. Participants' Reports of Their Satisfaction with Aspects of
M ediation: ........................................................................................ 367
Lisa B. Bingham, Keller-Runden Professor of Public Service and Director, Indiana
Conflict Resolution Institute, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Indiana; Kiwhan Kim, Doctoral student, Indiana University
School of Public and Environmental Affairs; Susan Summers Raines, Assistant Professor
of Conflict Management, Kennesaw State University, Georgia. The authors would like to
acknowledge the research assistance of Charles Salter, candidate for the degree of Juris
Doctor at Indiana University School of Law. This research was supported by major
funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. In addition, the authors are
grateful for the support and assistance of Traci Gabhart Gann, Kevin Hagan, Karen
Intrater, and Laree Martin at the United States Postal Service for their helpful comments
on the manuscript. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
V III. D ISCUSSION ......................................................................................... 372
IX . C ONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 375
I. IN'TRODUCTION
During the past twenty years, alternative or appropriate dispute
resolution (ADR) programs have begun to change the way employers deal
with both labor and employment disputes. Arbitration, mediation, neutral fact
finding, and ombuds offices are common ADR programs. Organizations with
unions have long used arbitration as a tool to address disputes. More
recently, organizations have adopted ADR, including mediation programs, in
non-unionized settings to provide an alternativ to costly and adversarial
litigation in the courts.1 This is often referred to as employment dispute
resolution.2 Mediation is a process in which parties negotiate a mutually
agreeable resolution to their dispute with the help of a third party neutral; it is
usually confidential.
3
This study investigates the role of representation in an employment
dispute resolution program independent from the collective bargaining
agreement. More specifically, this study uses data from exit surveys
completed by mediating parties and data tracking forms completed by
mediators as part of the United States Postal Service's (USPS) "Resolve
Employment Disputes Reach Equitable Solutions Swiftly" (REDRESS®)
program. This research examines the relationship between the presence and
nature of disputant representatives and mediation duration, mediation
outcomes, and aspects of disputant satisfaction.
I See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT,
DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND
HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (1997); KARL A. SLAIKEU & RALPH H.
HASSON, CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: How To DESIGN A SYSTEM FOR YOUR
ORGANIZATION (1998); WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING
SYSTEMS To CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT (1993).
2 See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe, Introduction and Overview, in
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING
WORKPLACE 1, 5 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999); see also Mary
Rowe, Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environment, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 79, 79 (Sandra E. Gleason
ed., 1997) (discussing recent innovations in non-union conflict management).
3 See CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 14, 118 (1986). For a review of the empirical literature, see James
A. Wall, Jr. et al., Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 370 (2001).
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First, we set this research in the context of other empirical and theoretical
work. We briefly address research on employment dispute resolution
generally and relevant theories for researching employment dispute
resolution. We review empirical research on the impact specific kinds of
representatives or agents have on dispute processing, such as union stewards
and labor lawyers in collectively bargained grievance-arbitration processes
and attorneys in mediation of disputes in civil litigation. We next outline a
useful theoretical frame for the instant study drawn from principal-agency
theory as applied to negotiation and dispute resolution by Professors
Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello.4 The remaining sections address the design
and history of the USPS employment mediation program (REDRESS®), the
data and methods used, analysis and results, and a discussion of results.
We conclude that representation in general makes a valuable contribution
to the mediation process, and that union representation specifically can play a
constructive role in an employment mediation program outside the collective
bargaining context. We also conclude that there is evidence suggesting that
union representatives, complainants' lawyers, and respondents' lawyers play
different roles in the mediation process, and that these differences are
consistent with what principal-agency theory would predict.
I. RESEARCHING EMPLOYMENT DisPum RESOLUTION
Workplace ADR programs are becoming increasingly common. A 1995
study found that 57% of 111 large manufacturing f'rms had instituted some
form of ADR to manage workplace conflict,5 while a GAO study placed the
percentage of large private employers with ADR programs for nonunion
employees at approximately 52%.6 Organizations adopt mediation,
arbitration, or other ADR programs for a number of reasons, including the
desire to reduce the costs of dispute resolution while improving workplace
communication and interpersonal relationships. 7 Some authors suggest that
4 See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000).
5 Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being Fair: Remedial Voice
Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. OF MGMT. 27, 33, 37 (1995).
6 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-
SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GAO/HEHS-95-150, at 21
(1995).
7 Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute Resolution in Employment: The
Need for Research, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 95, 98-99; see also Jonathon F. Anderson &
Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation of Workplace Disputes: Some
Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. LJ. 601, 602 (1997).
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corporations may adopt employment dispute resolution programs to deal with
workplace disputes because of a desire to avert unionization. 8 In fact, there is
evidence that when a union covers some but not all employees in an
organization, ADR policies are less likely to be offered to the non-unionized
employees. 9 Still other commentators surmise that unions could play a useful
role in employment arbitration through some form of associate membership
in exchange for representation services.10
In addition to the growth of ADR in private corporations, governmental
bodies are also increasing their use of ADR. 1I In recent years, legislation has
been introduced into the United States House of Representatives to mandate
federal agency participation in employment mediation upon the request of
the employee.12 As these programs spread, it is important that program
designers and program participants better understand the factors that
influence settlements and participant satisfaction.
Representation is one element of dispute system design, an element that
is judged to be fundamental to fairness according to the Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of
the Employment Relationship (Protocol).'3 The Protocol does not have the
force of law, but it does represent one statement of best practice in
employment dispute system design.
Although there is relatively little empirical research on employment
dispute resolution, 14 there is a body of work on the collectively bargained
8 DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF
CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS
15-19 (1998); See generally David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control:
The Corporate Embrace ofADR, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 134 (1998).
9 John Thomas Delaney & Peter Feuille, The Determinants of Nonunion Grievance
and Arbitration Procedures, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 529, 533-34 (John F. Burton Jr.
ed., 1992); see Feuille & Chachere, supra note 5, at 39.
10 Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A
Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108, 119 (1996).
11 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 507 (2001); Lisa B.
Bingham & Charles R. Wise, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990: How
Do We Evaluate its Success?, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 383, 384 (1996);
Rosemary O'Leary et al., The State of the States in Environmental Dispute Resolution, 14
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 515, 515 (1999).
12 The National Employment Dispute Resolution Act, H.R. 4593, 106th Cong.
(2000).
13 A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising out of the Employment Relationship, at
http://www.adr.org/rules/employment/protocol.html (May 9, 1995).
14 For a review of the literature, see BINGHAM & CHACHERE, supra note 7, at 97.
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grievance procedure. 15 This work is sufficiently well developed that it has
yielded a set of theories that can help frame research on employment dispute
resolution processes. The theories relevant to this study include systems
theory, human resource management theory, industrial relations theory, and
procedural-distributive justice theory. 16  Each of these theoretical
perspectives is briefly discussed below.
Systems theory and human resource management theory are alike in that
they examine the relationship between the grievance procedure and the
organization. 17 Specifically, systems theorists examine the connections
among several variables and the different stages of grievance procedures,
emphasizing a correlation between labor relations and the filing, processing,
settlement, and post-settlement outcomes of grievances. 18 Similarly, to the
extent that a union representative plays a role in a complaint process that is
parallel to, but independent from, the grievance procedure, industrial
relations theory suggests that the labor relations system and climate might
influence how the union representative executes his or her role.19
Those who examine grievance procedures from the perspective of human
resource management theory suggest that human resource practices
encouraging worker participation in work teams, problem-solving, and other
high-involvement activities can improve grievance procedures and have a
positive effect on organizational performance. 20 An employment dispute
resolution program that promotes employee direct participation, with any
representative of his or her choice, might similarly have a positive effect on
how employment disputes get processed.
Procedural justice theorists argue that organizational decisions will be
more readily accepted if the processes by which they are achieved are
perceived to be fair.2 Distributive justice theorists, in contrast, focus on "the
15See generally David Lewin, Theoretical and Empirical Research on the
Grievance Procedure and Arbitration: A Critical Review, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 137,
137 (summarizing and evaluating empirical research as to the grievance procedure).
16 For a comprehensive review and synthesis, see id.
17 Id. at 139-41.
1 8 See, e.g., DAVID LEWIN & RICHARD B. PETERSON, THE MODERN GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES 204-10 (1988).
19 See Lewin, supra note 2, at 140.
20 Id. at 141.
21 Jerald Greenberg, Looking Fair vs. Being Fair: Managing Impressions of
Organizational Justice, in 12 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 111, 112 (Barry M. Staw &
L.L. Cummings eds., 1990). See generally BLAIR H. SHEPPARD ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL
JUSTICE: THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS IN THE WORKPLACE (1992) (applying the justice
theory).
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fairness of the distribution of the conditions and goods that affect individual
well-being." 22 Previous work on procedural justice has shown that parties are
more likely to be satisfied with the outcome of a dispute resolution process
when they perceive that the process itself is fair.23 Parties in a dispute are
most likely to perceive the process as fair when they have an opportunity to
participate in the process, when they feel a sense of control over the process,
and when they are treated with respect. The right to representation is one
element relevant to process fairness. Many advocates for ADR feel that
disputants have more opportunities to participate during ADR proceedings
than in traditional court proceedings. This ability to voice concerns, be
treated with respect, and have control over the outcome of the mediation may
lead to higher satisfaction levels. Higher settlement rates and increased party
satisfaction may result in cost savings to employers as protracted litigation is
reduced or avoided. Employee turnover may also be reduced.24 Perceptions
of the fairness of the grievance procedure affect perceptions about the
effectiveness of those procedures; 25 indeed, researchers have found that
employee satisfaction is more strongly influenced by the perceived fairness
of the grievance procedure than by the perceived fairness of the grievance
outcome.26 In short, perceptions of process fairness significantly influence
employee perceptions and attitudes toward grievance procedures.
27
2 2 MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 1 (1985). For a general introduction to procedural and distributive justice,
see Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000).
23 See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (exploring how judgments on whether procedures and
social processes are fair can influence an individual's reaction to an experience);
SHEPPARD ET AL., supra note 21 (exploring the theme of justice in organizations); JOHN
W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1975).
24 Denise R. Chachere, Does Employee Voice Reduce Turnover? Some Evidence
from Nonunion Grievance Procedures, Presentation at the Industrial Relations Research
Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 1997).
25 LEWIN & PETERSON, supra note 18, at 132-36.
26 Gerald E. Fryxell & Michael E. Gordon, Workplace Justice and Job Satisfaction
as Predictors of Satisfaction with Union and Management, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 851, 862-
63 (1989).
27 R. Folger & J. Greenberg, Procedural Justice: An Interpretive Analysis of
Personnel Systems, in RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
141, 141-83 (M. Rowland & G.R. Ferris, eds., 1985); Fryxell & Gordon, supra note 26,
at 862-63.
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Il. ATTORNEYS AND UNION REPRESENTATIVES
Although there has been a growing body of commentary regarding what
constitutes appropriate lawyer-client representation in mediation,28 there has
been limited empirical research regarding the role of representatives in
employment dispute resolution.29 The extant empirical research addresses the
role of union stewards in collectively bargained grievance procedures, the
role of labor lawyers in grievance arbitration, and the role of lawyers in
mediation of lawsuits.
Industrial relations and organizational behavior scholars have examined
the role that shop stewards play in the collectively bargained grievance
procedure by seeking to quantify determinants of grievance activity. 30 One
study developed a model of grievance initiation by examining the grievance-
related behaviors of supervisors, employees, and shop stewards.
31
Researchers found that stewards with more years of education and
28 A review of that literature is beyond the scope of this article. For a helpful recent
review and synthesis of that literature, see Jean R. Stemlight, Lawyers' Representation of
Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a
Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 269 (1999) (examining in detail
arguments for and against adversarial advocacy by lawyers on behalf of clients in
mediation, and framing a way of examining how lawyers can help clients overcome
barriers to settlement and reach well-advised settlements in mediation). See generally
John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839 (1997) (arguing for high-quality consent by principals, including
explicit consideration of principals' goals and interests, explicit identification of plausible
options, principals' explicit choice of options for consideration, careful consideration of
options, mediators' restraint in pressuring principals to select particular options,
limitation on use of time pressure, and confirmation of consent, all in light of evolving
"liti-mediation" culture in which mediators view lawyers or agents as clients); Jacqueline
M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1369 (1998)
(arguing against adversarial representation and for a deliberative process model of client
representation and informed client consent in the mediation process).
29 See generally Bingham & Chachere, supra note 7 (examining recent empirical
research on alternative dispute resolution processes in the employment context).
30 For recent reviews of empirical literature on grievance procedures, see Peter
Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the Unionized Workplace, in WORKPLACE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 17 (Sandra E. Gleason ed., 1997); Peter Feuille, Grievance
Mediation, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 187; David Lewin, Theoretical and Empirical
Research on the Grievance Procedure and Arbitration: A Critical Review, in
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING
WORKPLACE, supra note 2, at 137.
31 Brian Benmels et al., The Roles of Supervisors, Employees, and Stewards in
Grievance Initiation, 45 INDUS. & LAB REL. REv. 15, 15 (1991).
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completion of the union's steward training were more likely to informally
resolve grievances. 32 More frequent attempts to resolve grievances
informally in turn reduced the grievance rate.33 In general, the authors found
that the grievance behaviors of employees and stewards were more useful in
predicting grievance rates than other characteristics, including race or gender
of employees and stewards, work groups, and technology. 34 One study of a
sample of southern labor locals found that while most grievance procedures
provided for an oral first step (85%), the majority of those interviewed (74%)
reported that few or no grievances were settled at that step, because first line
supervisors had no authority to settle.
35
Using principal-agency theory as his frame, Professor Brian Bernmels
found that shop stewards are most satisfied with grievance procedures that
permit oral presentation of grievances at the first step and screening by
grievance committees and others in union leadership. 36 Moreover, the higher
the grievance rate and larger the work group, the less satisfied stewards were
with the procedure, while the greater the proportion of grievances
successfully resolved by year end, the more satisfied the stewards. 37 This
makes sense, in that the grievance rate and number of employees represented
affect the steward's workload, while the resolution rate is a measure of the
steward's success as an agent. Bemmels observes that successful and timely
resolution of grievances "will enhance stewards' intrinsic rewards. 38
Studies have examined the impact of attorneys on labor arbitration, but
not mediation, outcomes. 39 In their work, Block and Stieber found that a
party received a more favorable labor arbitration outcome when they had
legal counsel and the other party did not.40 When both parties lacked legal
counsel, the outcomes were similar to those cases where both sides brought
32 Id. at 22.
33 Id. at 23.
341d. at 27.
35 Judith L. Catlett & Edwin L. Brown, Union Leaders' Perceptions of the
Grievance Process, 15 LAB. STUD. J 54, 58 (1990).
36 Brian Bemmels, Shop Stewards' Satisfaction with Grievance Procedures, 34




39 See, e.g., David E. Bloom & Christopher L. Cavanaugh, An Analysis of the
Selection of Arbitrators, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 408, 416-19 (1986).
40 Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on
Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 543, 553 (1987).
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legal counsel.41 Some researchers found that the presence of legal counsel
reduced delay in grievance arbitration.
42
The above research addresses the collectively bargained grievance-
arbitration process, not employment dispute resolution outside the collective
bargaining relationship. However, the role of union representatives and
coworker representatives in employment dispute resolution is the subject of
evolving legal standards under federal labor laws. An employee in a
unionized workplace may seek the assistance of a union representative when
using a dispute resolution program as one form of concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection.43 Employee protests of discrimination have been
held protected forms of concerted activity.44 The National Labor Relations
Board recently opened the door to coworkers as representatives in nonunion
work places, at least in investigatory interviews that may result in
discipline.45 In contrast to work on lawyers in labor arbitration, we have
found no relevant empirical research examining the role that union or
coworker representatives play in outcomes or perceptions of fairness in
mediation.
There is another body of empirical work examining lawyers in litigation
and ADR. Researchers examined the role of legal representation as part of a
comprehensive evaluation of litigants' perceptions of trials, court-annexed
arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences. They found, in general, that
disputants perceived litigation and arbitration as fairer and were more
satisfied with the outcomes of these than judicial settlement conferences.
46
They also found a statistically significant correlation between evaluations of
counsel and procedural justice and satisfaction.47 However, they found that
41 Id. at 553-54.
4 2 Allen Ponak et al., Using Event History Analysis To Model Delay in Grievance
Arbitration, 50 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 105, 118 (1996).
4 3 See generally 1 SECrION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR. ASs'N, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 137 (Patrick Hardin et al., eds., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW] (describing employee activity for mutual aid and protection as
including, for example, protests of violations of state law). Although the authors have
found no cases on point, this is the likely rule.
44 Id. at 159-60 (citing NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, 699 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1983)
enforcing 254 N.L.R.B. 520 (1981) (filing and pursuing Title VII claim held protected
concerted activity)).
45 Epilepsy Found. of N.E. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (July 10, 2000) (holding that
Weingarten rights to a representative extend to nonunion employees as a form of
concerted activity for mutual aid and-protection).
4 6 E. ALLAN LIND Er AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE 79 (1989).
47 Id. at61.
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participation did not appear to be an important factor in the parties'
judgments of procedural justice or satisfaction.
48
Stuart and Savage examined the impact of attorney representation on
ADR settlement rates in civil cases in a "multi-door" courthouse offering
mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and other ADR services.
49
They concluded that cases with attorney representation had settlement rates
of 48% compared to a settlement rate of 75% for those in which parties did
not have legal counsel.50 A number of scholars have examined the impact of
attorney representatives on the ability of parties to settle disputes in
litigation. These studies have particularly emphasized the potential conflict
of interest between resolving disputes efficiently and billing clients by the
hour.5 ' Arrow et al. state that the payoff structures inherent in most attorney-
client relationships generally reward adversarial behavior and may increase
the transaction costs of settling disputes.52 On the other hand, attorneys
receive a significant percentage of their business from referrals. Those
attorneys with reputations as efficient problem-solvers may increase the
amount of business they receive overall, rather than the number of billable
hours per client. On the whole, the authors conclude that "sometimes lawyers
help and sometimes they hurt, when it comes to cooperatively resolving
conflict."5
3
Some researchers have examined the role of lawyers in mediation of
certain kinds of cases. In divorce mediation, researchers observed that some
states forbid attorneys from directly participating in mediation, while others
regulate the process.5 4 "The typical rationale for excluding lawyers is that
they 'spoil' mediation: 'Lawyers will interfere with candid expression by the
parties and thwart a problem-solving style of negotiation.' 55 However, in an
interview study of Maine divorce lawyers with experience in mandatory
mediation, Professors McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman found that the family
48 /d. at 63.
49 Kenneth K. Stuart & Cynthia A. Savage, The Multi-Door Courthouse: How It's
Working, 26 COLO. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 13-17 (1997).
50 /d. at 14.
51 See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995); CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY
ORGANIZATIONS (1996).
52 BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 51, at 205.
53 Id. at 211.
54 Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
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law bar readily adapted to mediation and that lawyers learned with
experience the appropriate role to play in representing their divorce clients.56
Settlement rates for cases with lawyers in mandatory mediation compared
favorably to those reported for programs without lawyers.57
In a study of how corporations manage disputing, Professor McEwen
observed that the training that attorneys receive prepares them for the
adversarial relationships more commonly found in courtrooms than in
boardrooms, where joint-problem solving skills might prove more efficient.58
This training combines with a professional culture that encourages extremely
thorough and very costly discovery. 59 As a result, McEwen argues that the
activities of outside counsel can sometimes make dispute resolution more
costly and less efficient.60 Moreover, there are differences between the
incentive structures of outside counsel, who may be paid by the hour worked,
and in-house counsel, who earn a fixed annual salary regardless of
caseload. 61 However, as corporations seek to reduce overhead and target high
costs for outside counsel, some inside counsel take a different, more
proactive approach to managing disputing, and are moving toward earlier
efforts at dispute analysis and resolution.62
Professor John Lande similarly has found that while outside counsel
continue to have faith in litigation, business executives have less faith, and
in-house lawyers fall somewhere in the middle.63 In a subsequent study,
Professor Lande found that there was more congruence in attitudes toward
mediation among outside counsel, business executives and inside counsel,
but that inside lawyers believed that greater ADR use would improve their
prestige and opportunities to do satisfying work, while business executives
believed that ADR would provide greater autonomy from their lawyers. 64
One study of the ADR program implemented by the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination examined attorneys' perceptions of the
56 Id. at 1368.
57 Id. at 1364.
58 Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the
Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIo ST. J.
ONDISP. RESOL. 1, 13 (1998).
59 Id.
60 1d. at 11.
61 Id. at 11-12.
62 Id. at 18-19.
63 John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and
Executives' Opinions, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1998).
6 4 John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in
Mediation, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 209-10 (2000).
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program.65 However, the program was limited to parties with counsel; pro se
litigants were excluded.66 Attorneys reported quick resolution and liking the
process as leading advantages, while they cited the lack of settlement and
cost as the leading disadvantages.
67
This empirical research on lawyers, clients, and dispute resolution
suggests that there are differences in incentive structures among inside and
outside counsel, and divergent interests between principals including
business executives and their outside counsel agents. However, we have
uncovered no previous research examining the correlation between different
types of representatives, such as attorneys or union representatives, and
employment mediation duration, settlement rates, and participant
satisfaction.
IV. PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: A THEORETICAL FRAME
Mnookin, Peppet and Tulumello provide a framework for thinking about
how different kinds of representatives might affect the dynamics of
employment mediation.68 In an analysis of the tension between principals
and agents, they observe that benefits of using an agent or representative
include: (1) specialized knowledge about market conditions, formal or
informal norms, risks or opportunities; (2) resources such as access based on
the agent's reputation; (3) skills in negotiation because of experience,
training or ability; and (4) strategic advantages in the form of negotiation
tactics.69 There are costs of agency, including the direct cost of the agent's
fees and the hidden costs of building a relationship of trust with the agent,
despite the possible conflicting interests the agent may have with the
principal. 70 They note that principals and agents may differ as to preferences,
incentives and information. 71 For example, as to preferences, the principal
may be a one-shot player interested in the best outcome in a single deal,
while the agent may be a repeat player concerned about relationships with
65 Thomas A. Kochan et al., An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 233, 239-40 (2000).
66 Id. at 276-77.
67 Id. at 257.
68 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 69-91 (examining the tension between
principals and agents).
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other professionals and reputation in future deals.72 As to incentives, if the
agent is working on a fixed percentage commission, the agent may have an
interest in getting a quick deal, while the principal may want the agent to
work harder and longer for the best deal.7 3 The agent may have information
that has a bearing on the strength of the principal's position, but because the
agent either wants the principal to close a deal or wants the principal to reject
settlement, the agent may withhold that information.
74
These tensions are likely to play out differently with different kinds of
representatives or agents. At the USPS, an employee complainant must
obtain his or her own legal counsel, but may use the assistance of a union
representative for no cost. For this reason, in the employment setting, a
plaintiff's lawyer is more likely to be a one-shot player than a union
representative, who is a repeat player. Literature from game theory suggests
that repeat players and one-shot players operate differently in litigation and
dispute resolution.75 This may give lawyers different preferences than union
representatives in the course of their representation of similarly situated
principals, i.e., the employee complainants. The plaintiffs lawyer will
probably place a lower priority than a union representative on continuing
relationships at the workplace, and a higher priority on a one-time cash
settlement. Similarly, a friend, family member, or co-worker acting in a
representative capacity is likely to give priority to the employee
complainant's preferences and/or be more sensitive to continuing working
relationships.
There are also likely to be significant differences in incentives. Mnookin
observes that the incentives for lawyers have taken the form of a variety of
fee structures, including the contingency fee, the hourly fee, the fixed fee, the
mixed fee, as well as salary; however each of these has a flaw.76 In the
employment setting, a plaintiff's lawyer will not take a case on a contingency
fee unless he or she believes that there is a good likelihood of recovery
because he or she bears the risk of loss.77 Since plaintiffs' lawyers often have
a direct financial interest in the outcome of a case, they are likely to advise
against a settlement unless it provides for a sufficient fund to cover their fees.
72 Id.; see also Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974).
73 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 75-76.
74 Id. at 76. Differing rules of professional responsibility for lawyers as compared to
layperson representatives may also play a role.
75 See id. at 97-126; Galanter, supra note 72, at 98.
7 6 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 83.
77 Id.
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In contrast, the union representative's relationship to a fee structure is
attenuated. Employees pay union dues or agency service fees annually to
cover the costs of representation in collective bargaining and contract
administration.78 There is no direct relationship between a given
representative's caseload and compensation. The union representative will
not personally recover anything in a cash settlement. Similarly, when friends
or family act in a representative capacity, they typically take no financial
interest in the case. Thus, both of these latter categories of representatives
would be less concerned about a settlement involving non-economic
components.
Systems theory and industrial relations theory both suggest that union
representatives have incentives related to the health and well-being of the
union as an organization. 79 These incentives might influence the union
representative to resist or advise against any settlement that would conflict
with, undermine, or set a poor precedent in relation to the collective
bargaining agreement or relationship. In addition, union representatives may
have incentives apart from the union as an organization, for example,
concerns about managing a large caseload. To the extent that mediation
provides opportunities for resolving multiple cases in different complaint
streams, a union representative's incentives may differ from those of
lawyers, coworkers, family, or friends. A lawyer paid by the hour may not
have the same motivation.
There are also likely to be significant differences in information among
different categories of representatives. For example, lawyers will have
substantial knowledge and information regarding the merits of the underlying
legal claim, the legal process steps beyond mediation necessary to pursue
that claim, the attendant costs, and the likelihood of success. 80 Union
representatives may also acquire specialized expertise regarding employment
law, but the quality of that knowledge is likely to be more variable. Friends,
family and co-workers are likely to have the least technical knowledge about
relevant law. On the other hand, union representatives and co-workers will
have more information regarding the workplace. Union representatives in
particular will have more information about what is possible or workable in
terms of a settlement, especially one not primarily economic, such as
alternative work assignments.
It is important to acknowledge an interaction here between the nature of
the representative and the principal's power to choose. A principal makes a
conscious decision either to select a certain representative or to appear pro se,
78 See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 43, at 376.
79 Lewin, supra note 15, at 139-40.
8 0 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 70-71.
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that is, represent himself or herself.81 Several factors influence this choice.
An awareness of the advantages and disadvaintages of different kinds of
representatives probably informs this choice. For example, it is likely that a
principal with a stronger economic case will be more likely to seek out legal
counsel, and the strength of the case will induce the lawyer to accept it on a
contingent fee. On the other hand, a principal with a weaker economic case
might choose a coworker or family member because the principal primarily
seeks moral support. A principal with limited financial resources, but a desire
for more experienced representation, might seek a union representative. A
principal confident of his or her ability to advocate may opt to forego
representation. The principal's power to choose may also be influenced by
the strength of his or her case on the merits. How principals make these
choices is beyond the scope of this study. Thus, we cannot conclude here that
particular kinds of representatives produce particular outcomes. This study
can identify patterns, but it cannot prove cause and effect.
The existing empirical literature does not sufficiently address the
relationship between different types of representatives and the outcome of
the dispute resolution process or the parties' satisfaction levels, especially
concerning mediation and other forms of ADR processes. This study is
intended as an initial exploration of relevant data.
V. EMPLOYMENT MEDIATION AT THE USPS
In the spring of 1998, the USPS undertook national implementation of
the REDRESS® mediation program, which offers optional, voluntary
mediation to employees filing Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
complaints alleging prohibited discrimination. 82 Under the rule in Alexander
81 While early procedural justice research found a correlation between process
satisfaction and the power to choose an attorney in adversarial, contrasted with
inquisitory, litigation, Thibaut and Walker have found no direct empirical research on
how participants in dispute resolution choose different types of representatives. THIBAUT
& WALKER, supra note 23, at 94.
82 For a description of the program and national roll-out, see James R. Antes et al.,
Transforming Conflict Interactions in the Workplace: Documented Effects of the USPS
REDRESS® Program, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 429 (2001); Lisa B. Bingham &
Lisa-Marie Napoli, Employment Dispute Resolution and Workplace Culture: The
REDRESS® Program at the United States Postal Service, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 507 (Marshall J. Breger ed. 2001); Traci Gabhart Gann
& Cynthia J. Hallberlin, -Recruiting and Training Outside Neutrals, in FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK, supra, at 623; Cynthia J. Hallberlin,
Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation: Lessons Learned from Swimming
Upstream, 18 HOFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 375 (2001); Karen A. Intrater & Traci Gabhart
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v. Gardner-Denver Co.,83 all employees have the right to submit EEO
complaints to a process independent from the collectively bargained
grievance-arbitration procedure. Unlike other federal employers, the USPS is
subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.84 The
USPS is among the largest unionized employers in the United States.85 In
1997, USPS employees comprised approximately 30% of all federal
employees; they accounted for more than 50% of all EEO complaints. 86
Some proportion of this disparity may be attributable to the availability of
dual filing. As the General Accounting Office noted in its 1997 study, the
USPS has a long and ongoing history of difficult labor-management
relations, making it fertile ground for programs designed to resolve disputes
and improve communication. 87 While the USPS has an apparently
disproportionate number of EEO filings, incidents of violence occur no more
frequently within the USPS than in other organizations. 88 The high rate of
EEO complaint filing, the history of problems in labor-management
relations, and the sheer size of the USPS workforce of over 800,000 union
and non-union employees, makes the USPS an interesting case to study to
better understand the influence of representatives in mediation. Thus, the
study of the USPS can provide insights that are useful to other organizations.
The USPS selected the transformative model of mediation for its national
program. The premise of transformative mediation is that "the mediation
process contains within it a unique potential for transforming people-
engendering moral growth-by helping them wrestle with difficult
circumstances and bridge human differences, in the very midst of conflict. ' '89
Transformative mediation's potential lies in its power to give people control
over resolving their own conflict. Neutrals practicing transformative
Gann, The Lawyer's Role in Institutionalizing ADR, 18 HoFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 469
(2001).
83 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
84 39 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1204, 1208-1209 (1994).
85 Gann & Hallberlin, supra note 82, at 623; Bingham & Napoli, supra note 82, at
507.
86 Lisa B. Bingham & C.H. Hallberlin, Postal Service Expanding Workplace
Dispute Program, 40 CONSENSUS, Oct. 1998, at 1.
87 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE-LITTLE PROGRESS MADE IN
ADDRESSING PERSISTENT LABOR-MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS REPORTS, GAO/GGD-98-1
(1997).
88 THE NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIv., A
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE COMMISSION ON A SAFE AND SECURE
WORKPLACE 1-5 (2000).
89 ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 2 (1994).
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mediation seek to promote opportunities for empowerment and recognition.90
Parties become empowered when they "grow calmer, clearer, more
confident, more organized, and more decisive-and thereby establish or
regain a sense of strength and take control of their situation."91 The parties
give recognition when they "voluntarily choose to become more open,
attentive, sympathetic, and responsive to the situation of the other party,
thereby expanding their perspective to include an appreciation for another's
situation. ' 92 The mediators do not provide therapy for the parties; instead,
they attempt to help the parties to take control of their own decision-
making.9
3
There is preliminary evidence that mediation can have transformative
effects at the workplace. Early studies found that traditional facilitative
mediation in the REDRESS® program contributed to improving supervisors'
conflict management skills.94 The early facilitative REDRESS® mediation
model provided a positive alternative to the traditional adversarial EEO
complaint process because participants were highly satisfied with both the
process and the mediators and were generally satisfied with the outcome of
the mediation; these findings were consistent with the procedural justice
model. 95 Moreover, there is evidence that participants have higher
satisfaction with the fairness of the mediation process when an outside
neutral is used as opposed to when an inside neutral is used.96 By
emphasizing opportunities for voice and control, the transformative model is
consistent with procedural justice theory.
Another key element of the mediation program's design 'is
representation. Some private sector employers are designing employment
dispute resolution programs that provide arbitration but prohibit employees
90 Id. at 84.
91 Id. at 85.
92 1d. at 89.
93 For a review of therapeutic and other models of mediation, see Ellen A.
Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model
Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1997); Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative
Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L.
REv. 155 (1998).
94 Jonathon F. Anderson & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation of
Workplace Disputes: Some Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAi3. L.J. 601, 607-
08 (1997).
95 Lisa B. Bingham, Mediating Employment Disputes: Perceptions of REDRESS at
the United States Postal Service, 17 REv. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 20,29-30 (1997).
96 Lisa B. Bingham et al., Mediating Employment Disputes at the United States
Postal Service: A Comparison of In-House and Outside Neutral Mediator Models, 20
REv. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 4, 5 (2000).
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bringing legal counsel with them to the arbitration hearing. 97 In compliance
with EEOC directives, the USPS program provides that parties may bring
any representative they wish to the mediation session: union representatives,
attorneys, co-workers, or even friends and family, or they can choose not to
bring any representative at all. Representatives often offer moral support and
can provide parties with a "second opinion" about the fairness of settlement
options discussed.
There are significant differences between the representatives brought to
mediations by rank-and-file workers (known as "craft employees," which
include letter carriers, mail handlers, clerks and others) and those brought by
supervisors and managers. Supervisors and managers most frequently are
respondents, but sometimes they are complainants. Craft employees are
covered by collective bargaining agreements, and the unions' representatives
serve to ensure that any settlement does not violate the relevant collective
bargaining agreement. However, union representatives participate on behalf
of the individual employee, and not in an official capacity on behalf of the
union.
In contrast, supervisors and managers do not have the right to form a
union, nor do they have a collective bargaining agreement; however, there
are management associations that provide services to dues-paying
members. 98 More than three-quarters of all postal supervisors and managers
are members of either the National Association of Postal Supervisors
(NAPS) or the National Association of Postmasters of the United States
(NAPUS). As a result of their membership in these organizations, they
receive services such as representatives accompanying them to REDRESS®
mediations. 99 Unlike union representatives for craft employees, these
representatives are not present to ensure that a collective bargaining
agreement is followed because none exists. They can provide moral support
or raise issues regarding policies or postal regulations for a supervisor or
manager acting as complainant or respondent. Due to the differing roles held
by union representatives for craft workers and representatives for supervisors
and managers, it is likely that their impacts on mediation outcomes and
participation may also be somewhat different.
The impact of representatives on the duration of mediation sessions is an
important consideration for program participants and sponsors. To our
knowledge, little research exists which examines the impact of
97 Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration: Analysis of a
New Survey of Employment Arbitration Programs, DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 80.
98 See 39 U.S.C. § 1004 (1994) (providing for a program of USPS consultation with
recognized organizations of supervisory and other managerial personnel).
99 Personal communications with USPS Headquarters staff.
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representatives on the duration of mediation sessions. The REDRESS®
program thus affords an opportunity to explore the role of union and other
representatives in an employment dispute resolution program outside the
collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure. If the presence of
representatives does not add significantly to the length and cost of mediation,
but does increase the satisfaction of parties or the likelihood of settlement,
then program designers may wish to revisit the question of excluding
representatives.
VI. DATA AND IETHODS
This study uses two different sources of data: data tracking reports and
exit surveys.
A. Data Tracking Reports
At the conclusion of each mediation session, the mediators complete a
data tracking report. This report is a simple, one-page questionnaire designed
to help track response rates on participant exit surveys. This study uses 7651
data tracking reports to examine the numbers of complainants, respondents,
and representatives present; which parties had representatives; the
mediation's duration; and its outcome. In addition, the data tracking report
specifies how many exit surveys the mediator distributed to the parties and
their representatives.
B. Exit Surveys
The second source of data is mediation exit surveys. Mediators distribute
these surveys at the close of each mediation session and participants in the
session who are USPS employees may complete them during working time.
They are entirely anonymous and confidential and are mailed directly to
Indiana University. The surveys ask participants about their perceptions of
the mediation process, the mediator, and the outcome of the mediation. Exit
surveys allow for a more in-depth analysis of representation issues by
providing more precise information about the type of representative. Exit
surveys ask whether the representative(s) is an attorney, a union official, a
coworker, or some other person (friend or family member), and whether the
complainants and respondents are supervisors, managers, or rank-and-file
employees.
Analysis of the surveys reflects 88% of the parties filing complaints (i.e.,
complainants) are rank-and-file, bargaining unit employees, and 98%
responding to the complaints (i.e., respondents) are supervisors and managers
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outside the various USPS bargaining units. Only about 8% of all
complainants are supervisors, and 4% are not USPS employees at all, but
contractors or temporary workers. This makes sense, since most EEO
complaints allege discrimination in hiring, promotion, the distribution of
overtime, and so forth, and it is the supervisors and managers who generally
have the responsibility for implementing the relevant policies or rules.a0° On
rare occasions, a bargaining unit employee may serve on detail in a
supervisory capacity. As mentioned above, while the NAPS and NAPUS are
not actual "unions," they do provide many similar services, such as attending
disciplinary hearings and mediations with supervisors and managers. To
simplify our discussion we refer to union representatives, and NAPS or
NAPUS representatives as "union or association reps." The dataset includes
the complainants' responses, with a sample size of 7989. It also examines
respondents' responses, with a sample size of 6794. The response rate was
70.3%.
VII. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section first discusses results and analysis of the data tracking
reports and then turns to the exit surveys.
A. Data Tracking Reports from Mediators
The first round of analyses used the data tracking surveys to examine the
relationship between representation, mediation duration, and settlement. On
these surveys, mediators report representation of the parties, settlement, and
duration of the mediation session. In this analysis, the "representation"
variable has four possible conditions or manifestations: both the complainant
and the respondent have a representative; none of the disputants have
representatives; the complainant has a representative while the respondent
does not, or the respondent has a representative while the complainant does
not. The data tracking reports provide no data on the type of representative
(i.e., lawyer or union representative). In this model, settlement is coded as
either "settled" or "not settled." "Settled" cases include those resulting in a
mutually agreeable resolution either during or immediately after mediation.
To better understand the relationship between representatives and settlement
rates, we employed a Chi-Square test based on information obtained from the
data tracking reports.
10 Personal communication with USPS Headquarters staff (notes on file with
authors); EEOC Form 462 for FY 2001.
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B. Settlement Rates
Table 1 shows the distribution of settlements by the condition of
representation. As the table shows, complainants have representatives in
most mediation sessions, and 93% of the settlements occur when the
complainants have some kind of representative. Note that this table reports
only settlements, not all mediations.
Table 1. Distribution of Settlements by Condition of Representation
Complainants Respondents Settlements
Yes Yes 1533 (34%)
Yes No 2705 (59%)
No Yes 63(1%)
No No 267 (6%)
Table 2 shows the settlement rates within each of four conditions of
representation: complainants only represented, respondents only represented,
both represented, and neither represented. As the table shows, cases in which
neither party brought a representative had settlement rates approximately 6%
lower than those cases in which both parties brought representatives. Table 2
also shows that complainants decide to bring some form of representative in
the great majority of cases. When the complainant brought a representative(s)
and the respondent did not, settlement was more likely than for those cases in
which the reverse was true. It is possible that representatives lend moral
support, that their presence may help the parties feel more at ease during the
mediation process, and that they are able to offer their opinions as to the
reasonableness of any particular settlements the parties consider. It is also
possible that representatives exert pressure on the parties to reach a
settlement.
Table 2. Settlement Rates by Condition of Representation
Representation Settled Not Settled Totals
Complainants
only 2705 (60%) 1831 (40%) 4536 (100%)
Respondents
Only 63 (50%) 62 (50%) 125 (100%)
Both
Represented 1533 (61%) 969 (39%) 2502 (100%)
Neither
Represented 267 (55%) 221 (45%) 488 (100%)
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As Table 2 shows, there is a 10% difference in settlement rates between
the cases in which the "complainants only" were represented and those in
which the "respondent only" was represented. This difference might be
attributable to the differing positions these individuals often hold. Since
complainants are more likely to be rank-and-file workers while respondents
are more likely to be supervisors or managers, differing power levels may
influence settlement rates. It is possible that the assistance complainants
receive from their representatives aids in the equalization of power between
the disputants. Many theorists have argued that settlements are more likely to
occur when the disputants are equally powerful. 10 1 This theoretical lens
could explain why settlement rates are lowest when the respondent brings a
representative and the complainant does not. On the other hand, when
respondents bring representatives it may be a reflection of their belief that the
case is particularly contentious. If this is true, then lower settlement rates for
the "respondent only" condition could be a reflection of the nature of those
cases. Future research should attempt to control for the type and severity of
the case in order to investigate these possibilities.
C. Mediation Duration
Table 3 shows the mean duration of mediation sessions in minutes by
condition of representation. In general, mediation sessions are scheduled for
four-hour time blocks.
101 See, e.g., MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE
AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 343-47 (1973).
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Table 3. Representation and Mediation Duration, in Minutes
Standard
Representation Mean Deviation Frequencies
Complainants
only* 168 175 4536
Respondents
Only** 137 72 125
Both
Represented*** 184 96 2502
Neither
Represented**** 152 79 488
* F=6.05, p<.01; ** F=7.05, p<.01; *** F=24.08, p<.001; ** F=9.54, p<.01
In examining the relationship between representation and mediation
duration, we employed one-way ANOVA for each category. All of the
relationships were statistically significant at the level of .05 or better. In
terms of the length of mediation sessions, as one might expect, mediation
lasted longer when representatives were present. As shown in Table 3, when
both parties had representatives, the mean average length of the mediation
sessions was 184 minutes. This was 32 minutes longer than the average
length of mediation when neither party brought a representative. When the
complainant was the only party with representation, the average mediation
lasted 168 minutes compared to 137 minutes when the respondent was the
sole party represented. Therefore, the shortest mediation occurred when the
respondent was the sole represented party, and the longest occurred when
both parties were represented. However, the gap between the longest and
shortest mediation session was only 47 minutes. While anecdotal reports and
exit surveys suggest that supervisors have concerns about how much time
they spend in mediation, Table 3 suggests that the cost of this time is likely
outweighed by the benefit of the process.
D. Data Analysis of Participant Exit Surveys
The second phase of analysis examined participants' reports of
settlement, perceptions of fairness and participation, and satisfaction with
outcome as reported on exit surveys completed immediately after mediation
concluded. The study examined separate samples of surveys from
complainant/employees and respondent/supervisors. Once again using Chi-
Squares, we examined three relationships: the relationship between the types
of complainants' and respondents' representatives and the outcome of
mediation; the relationship between the types of representatives and the
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disputants' satisfaction with the fairness of the mediation process; and the
relationship between the types of representatives and the disputants'
satisfaction with their participation levels during mediation.
Table 4 describes the frequency with which complainants and
respondents bring various sorts of representatives.




No representative 2603 (33%) 4422 (65%)
Fellow employee 1077 (13%) 1077 (16%)
Attorney 251 (3%) 36 (1%)
Union or association 3399(43%) 74(1%)
representative
Other 659 (8%) 1185 (17%)
Total 7989 (100%) 6794 (100%)
In our study, about one-third of complainants chose not to bring a
representative at all, while more than half of all respondents chose not to
bring a representative.
E. Participants' Reports of Mediation Outcomes
Table 5 shows the complainants' and respondents' reported distribution
of mediation outcomes. The results are distributed among three possible
outcomes: complete, partial, and no resolution. In participant exit surveys,
the disputes were reported either completely or partially resolved in about
63-64% of the cases.102 This number is different than the case closure rate.
The overall case closure rate was 80% for all cases in the REDRESS®
Program.10 3 This closure rate includes full settlements reached at the table
during mediation, cases where the parties finalized a settlement within thirty
days after the close of mediation, cases where the complainant unilaterally
withdrew the complaint after mediation, and cases where after mediation the
102 The participant exit surveys are completed immediately at the close of mediation
and include only what has occurred during the mediation session up to that point. They
do not include activity on the case after the mediation session is over.
103 Mickey Meece, The Very Model of Conciliation: Companies Adopting Postal
Service Grievance Process, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2000, at C1.
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complainant declined to pursue the complaint to the formal complaint level
according to USPS statistics.
104
Table 5. A Comparison of Complainants' and Respondents' Reports of
Complete, Partial or No Resolution, Frequencies (Percentages)
Mediation Resolution Complainants Respondents
Complete resolution 2320 (29%) 2691 (40%)
Partial resolution 2696 (34%) 1650 (24%)
No resolution 2973 (37%) 2453 (36%)
Total 7989 (100%) 6794 (100%)
Interestingly, respondents were more likely to report that their case was
completely resolved than were complainants. It is possible that some
supervisors (usually respondents) leave the mediation session feeling that the
dispute has been completely resolved, while the rank-and-file employees feel
that some issues remain unresolved or that some negative feelings remain.
This finding should encourage mediators to work to make sure that both
parties leave the mediation with a very clear sense of what has been resolved
and what work remains unfinished.
Next, we examined the complainant exit survey sample for reports of
resolution by representation condition. Table 6 shows the relationship
between different types of complainant's representatives and the outcome of
mediation. The earlier analysis, based on the data tracking reports, allowed
us to conclude, for example, that settlement rates were different when both
parties were represented compared to those cases where only one party was
represented. The analysis shown in Table 6 allowed us to examine the
correlation between the type of representative and the complainants' reports
of mediation outcomes. If the complainant had a union representative, the
frequency at which either a complete or partial resolution was reported was
higher than in any other case, at 65%. On the other hand, when an attorney
represented complainants, the frequency that complainants reported
resolution was the lowest, at 50%. Both the union representative and the no
representative categories yielded reports of complete settlement 30% of the
time, while the attorney category yielded reports of complete settlement only
16% of the time. Chi-square analysis shows that these differences are
statistically significant at the level of .01.
104 Personal communication with USPS Headquarters staff (notes on file with
authors).
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Table 6. Complainants' Reports of Mediation Resolution
by Types of Representatives
Mediation
Resolution Type of Representation
Union
No Fellow Attorney or Other Total
Rep. Employee Ass'n
Rep.
Complete 772 295 41 1025 187 2320
(30%) (27%) (16%) (30%) (28%) (29%)
Partial 822 356 85 1203 230 2696
(32%) (33%) (34%) ,(35%) (35%) (34%)
No 1009 426 125 1171 242 2973
(39%) (40%) (50%) (34%) (37%) (37%)
Total 2603 1077 251 3399 659 7989
(101%) (100%) (100%) (99%) (100%) (100%)
Note. Pearson chi-square = 44.6, P< 0.0001; total percentage may not be 100
due to rounding
For a comparison, we turned to the respondents' exit survey sample. This
sample reflected only the responses of the supervisor/respondents in the
mediation. Table 7 shows the distribution of mediation outcomes based on
respondent's comments. As was the case for complainants, the highest
settlement rates for respondents occurred when a union or association
representative was present, with complete and partial settlement rates at 78%.
However, while the presence of attorneys for complainants corresponded to
significantly lower settlement rates for complainants (50%), the presence of
an attorney corresponded to a 67% settlement rate for respondents, second
only to those cases where a union representative is present. This is an
interesting finding that can be at least partially traced to the differences
between attorneys brought by craft workers versus those brought by
supervisors and managers. Unlike the attorneys for craft employees,
attorneys for supervisors and managers are supplied by the Postal Service
itself when the USPS determines that an attorney's presence is needed. These
attorneys are well versed in Postal Service policy and come at no cost to the
supervisors and managers. This may explain why the presence of attorneys
for respondents corresponded with a higher settlement rate than it did for
complainants. In addition, respondents reported that they had attorney
representatives in fewer than one percent of the surveys. This suggests these
cases might be different on the merits from the great majority in the sample.
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Table 7. Respondents' Reports of Mediation Resolution
by Types of Representatives
Mediation Types of Representative
resolution______________
Union
Fellow or Other Total
No rep. employee Attorney Ass'n
Rep.
Complete 1720 415 14 32 510 2691
(39%) (39%) (39%) (43%) (43%) (40%)
Partial 1069 273 10 26 272 1650
(24) (25%) (28%) (35%) (23%) (24%)
No 1633 389 12 16 403 2453
(37%) (36%) (33%) (22%) (34%) (36%)
Total 4422 1077 36 74 1185 6794
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Note. Pearson chi-square = 16.5, P< 0.05.
F. Participants' Reports of Their Satisfaction with Aspects of
Mediation:
Next, we examined the relationship between the types of representatives
and the reported satisfaction with the fairness of the mediation process.
Complainants and respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction levels on
a five-point scale ranging from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied," with a
rating of three corresponding to neither or no opinion. As shown in Table 8,
almost 90% of the complainants and 93% of the respondents were somewhat
satisfied or very satisfied with the fairness of the mediation process. The
REDRESS® program has consistently produced similarly high satisfaction
levels since its inception.
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Table 8. Comparison of Satisfaction Levels with Mediation Fairness
Satisfaction Level Complainants Respondents
Very satisfied 5022 (63%) 4786 (70%)
Somewhat satisfied 2124 (27%) 1536 (23%)
Neither 435 (5%) 309 (5%)
Somewhat dissatisfied 233 (3%) 107 (2%)
Very dissatisfied 175 (2%) 56 (1%)
Total 7989 (100%) 6794 (101%)
Note. Total percentage is not 100 due to rounding
While mediation participants were satisfied overall, their levels of
satisfaction varied with the type of representative present during mediation.
Moreover, complainants' and respondents' reports differed. Tables 9 and 10
show different satisfaction levels according to various types of
representatives. Table 9 reports complainants' satisfaction with mediation
fairness.
Table 9. Complainants' Satisfaction with Mediation Fairness
by Types of Representatives
Satisfaction Union
with No Fellow or
Fairness of Rep. employee Attorney Ass'n Other Total
Mediation Rep.
Very 1749 664 115 2127 367 5022
satisfied (67%) (62%) (46%) (63%) (56%) (63%)
Somewhat 621 279 76 937 211 2124
satisfied (24%) (26%) (30%) (28%) (32%) (27%)
Neither 125 67 28 174 41 435
(5%) (6%) (11%) (5%) (6%) (5%)
Somewhat 58 40 22 90 23 233
dissatisfied (2%) (4%) (9%) (3%) (3%) (3%)
Very 50 27 10 71 17 175
dissatisfied (2%) (3%) (4%) (2%) (3%) (2%)
Total 2603 1077 251 3399 659 7989
(100%) (101%) (100%) (101%) (100%) (100%)
Note. Pearson chi-square = 105.2,
100 due to rounding
P< 0.0001; total percentage may not be
When complainants had a union or association representative present in
mediation, they were likely to be more satisfied with the fairness of the
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mediation process compared to other types of representatives, with 91%
claiming to be either "very" or "somewhat satisfied." In contrast,
complainants represented by an attorney reported the lowest level of
satisfaction with the fairness of the mediation process, even though the level
was still high at 76%. Interestingly, when complainants, were not represented
at all, they reported being somewhat or very satisfied with the fairness of the
mediation process at approximately the same 91% rate as when they had a
union or association representative. However, the proportion of those
reporting that they were very satisfied was slightly higher among the no
representative category than among the union representative category (67%
compared with 63%). The presence of a union or association representative
was associated with the highest settlement rates for complainants. In other
words, complainants accompanied by a union or association representative
were more likely to settle their cases, but they were also likely to be slightly
less highly satisfied with the fairness of the process than were those
complainants who represented themselves. Perhaps the presence of a
representative made it somewhat more difficult for complainants to
participate as fully in mediation. Union or association representatives may
encourage settlement because of incentives such as their caseload or status as
repeat players with long-term relationships. A complainant who settles under
pressure may not feel fully vindicated. Another possibility is that the cases
were systematically different kinds of cases. The former issue is examined in
greater detail later in the paper. The latter issue is a subject for future
research.
Table 10 reports satisfaction with mediation fairness results for
respondents. As illustrated in Table 10, in the sample of respondents, those
with attorneys reported the highest levels of satisfaction at 95% either very or
somewhat satisfied. This was a substantial difference from complainants'
reports. This corresponded to the earlier findings showing that respondents'
reports of an attorney correlates with higher settlement rates. The second-
highest levels of satisfaction occurred when union or association
representatives accompanied respondents, or when they brought no
representatives at all, with both showing 94% very or somewhat satisfied.
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Table 10. Respondents' Reports of Satisfaction with Fairness
by Types of Representatives
Satisfaction Union
with No Fellow or
Fairness of Rep. employee Attorney Ass'n Other Total
Mediation Rep.
Very 3165 737 29 47 808 4786
satisfied (72%) (68%) (81%) (64%) (68%) (70%)
Somewhat 976 240 5 22 293 1536
satisfied (22%) (22%) (14%) (30%) (25%) (23%)
Neither 181 72 1 1 54 309
(4%) (7%) (3%) (1%) (5%) (5%)
Somewhat 70 17 1 3 16 107
dissatisfied (2%) (2%) (3%) (4%) (1%) (2%)
Very 30 11 0 1 14 56
dissatisfied (1%) (1%) (0%) (1%) (1%) (1%)
Total 4422 1077 36 74 1185 6794
(101%) (100%) (101%) (100%) (100%) (101%)
Note. Pearson chi-square = 31.51, P< 0.01; total percentage may not be 100
due to rounding
Some of the differences between complainants and respondents may be
explained by the differences between the attorneys and the union or
association representatives utilized by the two groups. Complainants'
attorneys generally come from outside the USPS while respondents'
attorneys are generally from the USPS. However, these differences between
respondents and complainants led us to wonder if the types of representatives
influenced the extent to which disputants were able to fully participate in the
mediation sessions. For example, it might be possible that the presence of an
attorney could result in reduced participation levels-with this effect being
particularly true for complainants because they generally hire private
counsel, while respondents' lawyers are usually supplied by the USPS, and
USPS lawyers have been trained in the goals of the program and the
transformative mediation process. If participation is key, it would make sense
for disputants to express fairly high levels of satisfaction when they bring no
representatives at all. Based on the questions raised by these findings, we
undertook an examination of the relationship between the types of
representatives and disputants' satisfaction with their own participation
levels during the mediation process.
Table 11 shows satisfaction levels concerning complainants'
participation according to different types of representatives.
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Table 11. Complainants' Satisfaction Level with Participation
by Types of Representatives
Satisfaction Union
with No Fellow or
Participation Rep. employee Attorney Ass'n Other Total
in Mediation Rep.
Very satisfied 1976 757 137 2457 461 5788
(76%) (70%) (55%) (72%) (70%) (72%)
Somewhat 536 264 92 801 165 1858
satisfied (21%) (25%) (37%) (24%) (25%) (23%)
Neither 49 35 11 73 19 187
(2%) (3%) (4%) (2%) (3%) (2%)
Somewhat 27 17 7 51 12 114
dissatisfied (1%) (2%) (3%) (2%) (2%) (1%)
Very 15 4 4 17 2 42
dissatisfied (1%) (0%) (2%) (1%) (0%) (1%)
Total 2603 1077 251 3399 659 7989
(101%) (100%) (101%) (101%) (100%) (99%)
Note. Pearson chi-square = 71.5, P< 0.0001; total percentage may not be 100
due to rounding
As Table 11 shows, the findings about participation were similar to those
measuring satisfaction with process fairness. When complainants were not
represented at all, they were most likely to be satisfied with their level of
participation in the mediation process, with 97% reporting satisfaction.
Complaints accompanied by a union or association official came in a close
second, with 96% reporting satisfaction. Even though the complainants were
less likely to be satisfied with participation when accompanied by an
attorney, the level was still very high at 92% compared to that of satisfaction
with the fairness of the process, at 76%.
In contrast to the results for complainants, respondents reported the
highest levels of satisfaction with their level of participation when an
attorney was present, at 97%. For respondents, the presence of a union or
association representative corresponded to the lowest levels of satisfaction
with their own participation levels.
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Table 12. Respondents' Satisfaction with Participation by
Types of Representatives
Satisfaction Union
with No Fellow Attorney or Other Total
Participation Rep. employee Ass'n
in Mediation Rep.
Very satisfied 3215 750 27 40 812 4844
(73%) (70%) (75%) (54%) (69%) (71%)
Somewhat 1021 258 8 28 322 1637
satisfied (23%) (24%) (22%) (38%) (27%) (24%)
Neither 122 46 1 1 37 207
(3%) (4%) (3%) (1%) (3%) (3%)
Somewhat 50 12 0 5 9 76
dissatisfied (1%) (1%) (0%) (7%) (1%) (1%)
Very 14 11 0 0 5 30
dissatisfied (0%) (1%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Total 4422 1077 36 74 1185 6794
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (99%)
Note. Pearson chi-square = 58.7, P< 0.0001; total percentage may not be 100
due to rounding
VIII. DISCUSSION
The data point to a number of interesting directions for future research.
First, the presence of complainants' union or association representatives in
REDRESSTM mediations is associated with higher reported settlement rates,
compared to those cases in which another kind of representative is present.
Why are union or association representatives associated with more frequent
settlement? They are repeat players in the system, familiar with workplace
norms, and they have ongoing relationships with managers and their
representatives.10 5 They have different knowledge about possibilities for
settlement as compared with the average co-worker, who may have limited
experience settling grievances and working out deals with management.
They have different preferences from private lawyers, who may be looking to
create a cash pool from which to recover attorneys' fees. Most settlements in
the REDRESSTM program involve continuing employment relationships and
are non-economic. 10 6 Non-economic settlements include removal of
105 Communications with staff at USPS Headquarters (notes on file with authors).
106 Communications with staff at USPS Headquarters (notes on file with authors);
EEOC Form 462 for FY 2001. In contrast, in the MCAD program, researchers found that
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discipline, reinstatement of leave, overtime eligibility, and the like.
Moreover, a substantial proportion of non-economic settlements include an
apology and an agreement to communicate differently, for example, with
mutual respect and 'civility in the future.107 A union or association
representative would have no reason to resist a non-economic solution.
Moreover, these types of settlements may be easier for management to
implement.
Second, complainants accompanied by union or association
representatives were more satisfied than were those with other types of
representatives. However, as to their own participation and the fairness of
mediation, complainants with any type of representative were less satisfied
than complainants who represented themselves. The largest differences arose
between complainants with attorneys and those with no representatives,
although the effect was present for all the conditions involving some kind of
complainants' representative. In contrast, respondents with attorneys reported
the highest levels of satisfaction with the mediation's fairness and with their
own participation in mediation. This may also reflect management structure
in that they are more likely to be executives.
These findings reflect the tension between principal and agent, and
differences as to preferences, incentives and information. Principals and
agents may have different preferences as to how much each of them should
participate directly in the mediation, that is, who gets to talk and how much.
In the transformative model of mediation, the parties are encouraged to
participate more directly.10 8 Internal marketing of the program to employees
and supervisors stresses this aspect of the model. When complainants bring
any type of representative to mediation, it is likely that their direct
participation declines. Procedural justice research has revealed that the
control over the dispute resolution process is an important factor influencing
perceptions of process fairness.109 The ability to participate in a process is
one form. of process control. 1 10 Thus, when an agent speaks for the principal,
most of the 636 settled cases had economic settlements with a median of $25,000 and a
mean of $51,730. They also found 15% of the settlements called for change in employer
practices, and 17% called for apologies. Most cases involved the end of an employment
relationship. Kochan et al., supra note 65, at 259-60.
107 Communications with REDRESS TM Task Force and USPS Headquarters, and a
review of settlement documents are both on file with authors.
108 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 89, at 84-89; Antes et al., supra note 82, at 466;
Hallberlin, supra note 82, at 378-80; Intrater & Gabhart Gann, supra note 82, at 472-73.
109 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 23, at 94-101; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note
23, at 119-22.
110 While some researchers found that participation was not an important factor, that
study did not compare different types of representatives within mediation, but instead
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this may contribute to decreased satisfaction with participation, and in turn,
lower satisfaction with fairness. Our findings were consistent with this
interpretation because the complainants' satisfaction with participation co-
varied with their perception that the process was fair. Those complainants
represented by attorneys reported the lowest level of participation
satisfaction, at 91%, and were least satisfied with the fairness of the process,
at 76%. Complainants without representatives reported the highest level of
satisfaction with their own participation, at 97%, and were most likely to be
satisfied with the fairness of the process, at 91%. It makes sense that lawyers,
trained to protect their clients from making damaging admissions against
their own interests, would make more effort to control what and how much
complainants said during mediation. Moreover, complainants' lawyers have
not necessarily received training in the transformative model of mediation.
Their expectations regarding appropriate advocacy in mediation may have
been formed with more evaluative and directive mediation models used in
court-annexed mediation. In contrast, respondents' lawyers from inside the
USPS have most likely received transformative mediation training, at least in
the form of initial briefings regarding the model. In contrast to their lawyers,
complainants may prefer to have their say during the mediation session rather
than waiting for some unknown future trial date. These findings have
important practical implications, as attorneys and other types of
representatives may wish to encourage greater direct participation by the
complaining party in mediation sessions.
Importantly, this relationship did not hold true for respondents. Unlike
complainants, respondents were most satisfied with the mediation's fairness
and with their own levels of participation when an attorney accompanied
them-even though their settlement rates were higher when they had a union
or association representative. This difference may partially be explained by
the differences between the private outside attorneys hired by complainants
and the inside counsel supplied to supervisors and managers by the Postal
Service. In addition, although our sample size overall was very large, the
sample size for respondents with lawyers was small.
Our review of the research predicted differences between inside and
outside counsel representing clients in mediation. Inside counsels' incentive
structure is more closely aligned with that of their principal. Another possible
explanation is control over the process.11 USPS attorneys have higher status
and power within the organization than the average immediate supervisor;
examined parties with lawyers in third party processes, judicial settlement conferences,
arbitration, and trial. LIND ET AL., supra note 46, at 2, 62. One might expect that
participation by the disputants might not vary as much where they are represented by the
same kind of agent, namely lawyers.
111 LIND & TYLER, supra note 23, at 94-101; SHEPPARD Er AL., supra note 21, at 32.
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therefore, when they are present to provide assistance and support,
supervisors may feel that they have cover, that is, more control over the
process and protection from any adverse ramifications of a settlement.
Moreover, supervisors are likely to have preferences that are very similar to
those of their USPS lawyers, because they are both part of the management
chain of the organization.
The rival explanation for these findings points to the possibility that
complainants seek lawyers for cases that are stronger on the merits, more
contentious, and complex. 112 These may also be the cases that predictably
would have been less likely to reach a mediated resolution. Complainants in
these cases may be distrustful of the process itself and more reticent to
participate directly. 1 3 Without controlling for the severity of the case or for
the relationship of case severity to representation, it is not possible to
definitively state that the presence of a lawyer representative directly
decreases settlement rates or decreases the complainants' participation levels
and their sense that the process was fair. Both explanations may contribute to
the findings. Controlling for the type and severity of the case in future
research should increase our understanding of these issues.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This article has examined the effects of representation on resolution
(complete, partial, or no resolution), duration of the mediation session,
satisfaction with the fairness of mediation, and satisfaction with level of
participation. It has examined the effects of different kinds of representation,
including lawyers, union representatives, fellow employees, other
representatives such as family, or no representative.
We found that the highest resolution rates occurred when the
complainant had some sort of representative. Mediation lasted longest when
both parties had representatives, and was of shortest duration when only the
respondent was represented. In the USPS program, complainants most.often
brought a union representative, while respondents most often have no
representative in the mediation sessions. While the highest complete
112 See Kenneth Kressel, Mediation, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 522, 524 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds.,
2000) (observing that research shows high level of conflict is associated with difficulty in
settlement in mediation).
113 One study of mediation and arbitration of discrimination complaints found that
the most important barrier to participation in the ADR program was the lack of
willingness of one party to the dispute. Kochan et al., supra note 65, at 257. However,
this barrier was identified by their lawyers; the response rate from the parties themselves
was too low to analyze.
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resolution rate occurred when complainants had union or association
representatives, complainants' highest level of satisfaction with the fairness
of mediation occurred when they brought no representative. In contrast,
respondents' highest level of satisfaction with the fairness of mediation
occurred when they had a USPS lawyer as a representative. The parties'
satisfaction with fairness was related to their satisfaction with their level of
participation in the process. Complainants were more satisfied with their
level of participation when they had no representative or a union association
representative. Respondents were more satisfied with their level of
participation when they had an attorney. In general, there was no evidence
that the policy of allowing free choice of representatives had any negative
effect on the program. The various findings are consistent with what we
might expect in light of principal-agency theory and differences in agents'
preferences, incentives, and information.
While further research in this area is needed, these preliminary results
suggest that union representation during mediation sessions may have
benefits for both the employee and the employer. Given current economic
trends, including the increased globalization of labor competition, it is
unlikely that a new wave of private sector unionization will occur any time
soon in the U.S. or in other economically developed countries. 114 However,
114 Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 13 (1993) ("This story has changed because American
industry and the U.S. place in the world economy has changed. The ability of unions to
'take wages out of competition' has declined substantially thanks to the competitive
forces unleashed by the emergence of global product markets; the deregulation of
previously union-dense industries, such as airlines, trucking, and telecommunications;
and technological change altering needs for skilled labor and reducing the advantages of
local producers."); Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor
Reform, 12 LAB. LAW. 117, 118 (1996) ("The principal cause of labor's decline,
however, lies elsewhere: the model of employee organization promoted by the labor laws
has failed to keep pace with the unleashing of competitive forces in product markets as a
result of deregulation, technological advances, and global competition."); Kenneth M.
Piper, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 3, 3 (1993) ("U.S. private sector unionism is in decline. From a high watermark in
1953 of around 35.7% of the private nonagricultural workforce, union membership has
fallen to 11.5% and unions represent under 13% of private sector workers. Absent reform
of the labor relations system, the trend is clear. Unions will remain a significant force in
government employment, big-city commercial construction, rail and air transportation,
and certain shrinking mining and manufacturing industries. Aside from these pockets of
unionism, however, the size of unions peaked in the 1950's and union density began to
decline relative to an expanding work force. By the late 1970's, private sector union
membership was dropping sharply in absolute size and even more steeply in relative
terms. At present, private sector union membership is approximately 12% of private
employment, roughly the level it was before the NLRA was enacted in 1935. Unless an
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there is nothing to stop an individual from joining a union and paying dues in
exchange for certain services, such as representation during ADR
proceedings. Many unions already have dues structures that allow for
"associate members" to join and receive some benefits. Because union
representation is associated with higher settlement rates for both
complainants and respondents and higher satisfaction levels for complainants
than occurs with other types of representatives, unionized private sector
employers may want to rethink opposition to some form of union
participation in employment dispute resolution. The dispute resolution field
needs more empirical research regarding how these systems actually
function. This study empirically supports what the Protocol calls for in
principle: dispute resolution systems that permit employees their choice of
representatives are likely to function at least as effectively, if not better, than
systems where employees have no right to bring a representative." 15
unexpected turnaround occurs, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, less than
10% of private sector employees will have their interests represented through collective
bargaining, and unionism will be largely isolated in a number of aging industrial
ghettos.").
115 Id.
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